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My purpose is to discuss the ethics of genetically engineered foods for
health␣ (GE foods for health, GE foods). Ethical questions about agricultural
biotechnology in general, and about specific applications, such as biofuels
and␣ biomaterials, have been addressed in previous NABC meetings. These
have␣ included considerations of environmental safety, research ethics, and
socioeconomic concerns such as power and control in the food system (e.g.
Thompson, 2000; Comstock, 2001). I want to focus on a different kind—
perhaps a different order—of questions associated with ethics and agricultural
biotechnology. These concern the basic ethical legitimacy of GE foods for
health. Simply put, are these GE foods ethically justifiable? The importance
of␣ this issue stems from the increasing human and financial resources that are
being committed to research and development on GE foods. Yet, most people
in␣ the food biotechnology establishment have never asked whether this R&D
is␣ ethically justifiable in the first place. Indeed, most appear to assume that
GE␣ foods are ethically justifiable or legitimate. This assumption may not be
legitimate, even if science generally is ethically justifiable and some other
applications of biotechnology are also legitimate. If GE foods are ethically
justifiable, the biotechnology establishment will have to accept the ethical
responsibility to prove that they are. This, however, implies that some other
questions, specifically concerning the ethical responsibilities of those in the
biotechnology establishment, need to be addressed.
ETHICAL QUESTIONS
Basic ethical questions are normative and critical. They ask for justifications
for␣ actions, for the principles or reasons why we should or should not do
certain things. Ethical questions demand reflection on our principles and
values, on the way we live our lives, and how we interact among ourselves
as␣ we go about our business. Critical ethical reflection should give us answers
to the following questions:
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1. Should we genetically engineer foods to produce health- and nutrition-
enhancing traits?
2. Are we ethically justified in doing so?
3. And, most importantly, why are we ethically justified in this work—that is,
on what principled basis?
There are two main kinds of ethical principles that can be employed to justify
and critique actions and /or practices: Consequentialist and Intentionalist.
Consequentialist ethical principles assess actions or practices in terms of their
outcomes. Accordingly, good outcomes justify an action, bad outcomes
condemn it. How “good” and “bad” are defined is, of course, critical, though
most ethicists interpret good in terms of benefits and bad in terms of costs or
risks. It is important to note that consequentialist ethics stand in contrast to
intentionalist ethics (technically, deontological ethics). Intentionalist principles
judge actions in terms of their consonance with a pre-determined set of duties
or virtuous character traits. Intentionalist justifications undertake to show
that␣ people have followed or tried to follow what ethical principles demand.
When people do their duty, they are justified; when they stray from acting on
principle, they are wrong.
Before we can ask whether GE foods are ethically justifiable, we need to
ask␣ on what ethical basis science in general is to be judged. This is important,
because science is usually regarded as ethically neutral. Science generates
knowledge and technology, and it is only after the results of scientific practice
are in the public arena that questions can be raised as to their ethical
justifiability. But this is precisely the point. While the ethical neutrality of
science may be a goal or ideal, in fact we judge science by its results or
outcomes. Indeed, scientists appear to want their work to be judged by its
fruits. There is some consensus among ethical analysts that the very nature
of␣ modern science—institutionalized, corporate, product-driven—demands
that␣ we focus on outcomes or products as a way of determining whether the
scientific enterprise is ethically sound, since it is difficult, if not impossible,
to␣ discern intentions to be dutiful or virtuous. The ethical basis for judging
science must, therefore, be a consequentialist ethical principle: science is
justified when its outcomes are justifiable. Usually, this means when its
consequences are beneficial. When science confers benefits that outweigh
costs␣ or override risks, it is considered to be engaged in justifiable practices.
When it does not confer benefits, ethical questions remain (Burkhardt, 1992).
As much as we may want science to conform to predetermined ethical
principles or virtues such as the Golden Rule or the Hippocratic Oath, in
fact␣ we judge it by its results.
There is consensus among ethical analysts—echoed by many scientists and
endorsed by the public—that science has prima facie ethical legitimacy. Science
has produced knowledge and technologies whose benefits are clear and
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outweigh any relevant costs or risks. Certainly, on occasion, science has
generated outcomes of a less-than-clearly-beneficial nature. Overall, however,
it␣ has succeeded in an ethical sense. The importance of this ethical legitimacy
cannot be overstated, because it confers on the larger scientific enterprise an
ethical “high ground” from which scientists and research administrators can
defend themselves from critics, and command resources and moral support
from the public. Surveys have shown a general trust of university scientists and
medical people, providing some support for this claim. This is because the
public believes that science has justified itself through what it has delivered
(NSF, 2000). For the past several years, researchers engaged in biotechnology
have been making a bid for the same ethical justifiability and public credibility,
which has met with less success. Ultimately, the outcome of this attempt will
depend on benefits actually delivered.
Indeed, the question is whether a currently proposed set of products—GE
foods for health—is ethically justifiable. According to consequentialism, actions
are ethical only if they provide benefits that outweigh costs and minimize risks.
Products that are the outcomes of those actions are legitimate only if they are
truly beneficial. Are GE foods beneficial? The problem is, we cannot answer
that question, since GE foods do not yet exist in a real-world context in which
to judge their benefits.
We can, however, ask a similar question about GE products currently on the
market and extrapolate an answer for foods for health. Consider two types of
current GE products: in the medical arena, human insulin and in agriculture,
Bt ␣ corn. Are these products ethically acceptable, meaning, are they beneficial?
If␣ so, the actions of those who researched, developed, commercialized and
marketed them are (were) justifiable.
Regarding GE human insulin, I think the answer is yes. Genetic engineering
has resulted in a product that serves a significant portion of the public, without
risk or benefit to the rest of society, and with only minimal (if any) risk to the
consumer. The benefits conferred far outweigh any risks. We might even make
the case that once scientists knew how to engineer bacteria to produce human
insulin, they were ethically obliged to do so.
Bt corn appears to be less unequivocal as to benefit/cost/risk assessment. This
is not to say that it is ethically unacceptable. There are ongoing debates about
environmental and economic risks, and questions as to farmers’ ability to sell
Bt ␣ crops. This may be a situation in which differing parties to the debates have
different understanding of what counts as a benefit and what counts as a cost
or␣ risk. The point is that a consequentialist ethical principle such as “provide
benefits greater than risks” demands that “benefits greater than risks” must
be␣ proven unequivocally for the action or product under consideration to be
ethically justified.
This points to an important concern regarding the ethics of GE foods for
health. If consequentialist ethics demand actual benefit/risk/cost calculation in
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order for an action to be justified, future products of genetic engineering cannot
(yet) be subject to an ethical judgement. It would appear that we cannot answer
the question, “Is research and development of GE foods for health ethically
justifiable?” Yet, given the clearly positive connotation of the term “foods for
health” and the clearly beneficial nature of the kinds of GE foods that have
been proposed, biotechnologists, nutritionists, farmers, and many others want
to answer that question with a resounding “Yes!” Despite hopes and visions of
a␣ hunger-free world and universal health, ethics demand that some principled
reason be given for that answer. This reason can be found in what I refer to as
the “Future Benefits” argument.
THE FUTURE BENEFITS ARGUMENT
The vision and hopes associated with GE foods for health are occasionally
framed in terms of slogans proclaiming “the promise of biotechnology.” There
is␣ actually a philosophically sophisticated and potentially powerful argument
that underlies the slogan. This argument might provide an ethical justification
for the actions of people in the agricultural and scientific communities who not
only believe that pursuit of products such as the “foods for health” is ethically
justifiable but that it is obligatory. In one form, the “Future Benefits” argument
is as follows (Burkhardt, 2001):
1. Technologies intended to provide benefits in the future are ethically
justifiable if they will provide benefits that outweigh risks/costs.
2. Agricultural biotechnology will provide benefits in the future that
outweigh risks/costs.
3. Therefore, current agricultural biotechnology R&D is ethically justifiable.
Two things are initially worth noting. First, Premise 1 is a general principle
that establishes conditions on ethical acceptability or justifiability. Second,
Premise 1 is a consequentialist principle, concerned with the outcomes of
(future) actions or, in this case, technology products. This is important because
it means that ethical justifiability depends on benefits actually being conferred
that outweigh risks or costs. It further means that the conclusion, i.e. that
current research and product development is ethically acceptable, depends on
those benefits actually being conferred. The onus is on what the second premise
actually means.
In the way that it is stated, Premise 2 looks like a prediction, an answer to
several of the “can” and “will” questions found in the conference program. This
begs the question, “What will it take for Premise 2 to come true?”
Charles Arntzen (2002) noted several hurdles that must be overcome for the
hope of medicine’s and agriculture’s merger to be fulfilled, and I will not dwell
on them. Still, we must note that the first and foremost condition for functional
foods to become a reality is that scientists succeed in their individual and
collective enterprises. Crops must be transformed so that health and nutritional
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properties can be added or enhanced, or allergenic properties eliminated.
Beneficial traits must be introduced or enhanced in crops that people already
consume or will readily adjust to consuming. There will have to be legal and
institutional successes as well, as Gregory Jaffe (2002) has pointed out. The
patent process will have to be successfully negotiated both domestically and
internationally. Differences in the cultures that prevail in medical/health/
nutritional research, agriculture, and agricultural research will have to be
worked through. Corporations involved in everything from life-sciences
research to marketing seed may have to adjust to the realities of dealing with
perhaps numerous federal, regional, state/provincial or even local bodies such
as health departments rather than just one or two federal government agencies.
Ultimately, consumers will have to accept the new foods. Furthermore, the
products must be such that their first consumer, the farmer, can easily adapt
and grow the crops. For example, protein-enriched wheat that requires
excessive inputs of, say, water or a grower’s time, without there being a
concomitant price increase, would never succeed.
GE foods for health will ultimately have to reach, and be accepted by, the
ordinary consumer. This means that these foods will have to be compatible with
consumers’ tastes and preferences, lifestyles, and basic values. Most importantly,
these foods will have to be available and affordable, or they will fail. Even if
they are inexpensive, nutritious, delicious, allergen-free, disease-curing, etc.,
possessing all of the health-positive characteristics we currently envision, if
they fail in the marketplace they will fail to confer the benefits necessary to
make their present development ethically justifiable. In other words, GE foods
will actually have to be beneficial in order for them to be ethical. Will they be
beneficial? Will they succeed at each step in the chain, from the laboratory,
through regulatory assessment, through farmers’ fields, to the dinner table?
Although social scientists can offer some assurances about the future, most
would concede that they can predict only broad social trends or patterns. Since
science, law, agriculture, and economics are all human enterprises, predictions
about the benefits of future foods for health are uncertain.
If we cannot reasonably predict that agricultural biotechnology will confer
benefits in the future, the Future Benefits argument fails, leaving the conclusion
without foundation. If biotechnology will not confer future benefits, then, in
terms of consequentialist ethics, current research and development are not
ethically justifiable.
Clearly, this conclusion contradicts what most of us believe about future
foods for health and about current work being done to produce them. It
certainly contradicts what most of us hope about them. The above conclusion
suggests, however, that we might want to interpret the Future Benefits
argument’s Premise 2—agriculture biotechnology will provide benefits in the
future—not as a prediction, but as a promise. There has certainly been enough
rhetoric about the “Promise of Biotechnology.” Perhaps it is time to interpret
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that “promise” not in terms of potential, but as an ethical commitment. As such,
“agricultural biotechnology will provide benefits in the future” means that those
who engage in it place themselves under an ethical obligation to guarantee, as
far as it is within their power, that benefits are actually conferred sometime in
the future. Since “agricultural biotechnology” means the whole food biotech-
nology establishment—all the individuals and institutions that surround the
conceptualization, research, development, marketing, etc.—this also includes
those in the medical/health/nutritional establishment engaged in this enterprise.
THE PROMISE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY
The “Promise of Biotechnology,” so understood, immediately leads to another
set of ethical questions, and to many scientific and social-political-economic
questions that follow from them. Promises or commitments are only as good as
the possibility of their being carried out. One question that immediately arises
is thus: “What should one do to guarantee that benefits result from one’s work
in this enterprise?” This may appear to be a scientific question—e.g., “What
will make this plant species exhibit this trait?”—and this is certainly relevant.
More to the point, however, are questions that address social-political-economic
concerns: “What future institutional or historical or economic conditions must
be in place for the benefits of GE foods for health to be fully realized?” “What
must we do to ensure, strengthen, or change institutions so that benefits are
realized?” These questions follow from a prior commitment to help bring about
the “promised” benefits of GE foods for health.
One standard argument used to justify the high prices of prescription drugs
is␣ the cost of producing them. These costs include everything from basic
laboratory research to obtaining patents, to passing regulatory requirements
concerning utility and safety, to marketing. People in poverty and those on
fixed incomes might begrudge pharmaceutical companies the high costs of
health-preserving and lifesaving medications. In a comparatively free-market
context, however, it is not the pharmaceutical companies’ responsibilities to
ensure affordability. Governments, employers, or individuals must shoulder the
burden if everyone who needs medications is to receive them.
We have reached a situation in which conditions are ripe for the same thing
to happen with food, especially new disease-fighting or nutrition-enhancing
foods for health. Similar institutional R&D, patenting, regulatory and
production costs will occur, and we must also include the farmer’s livelihood as
an additional cost. If we are to fulfill our “promise of biotechnology,” it seems
to be implied that we—whoever can affect such things—must attempt to make
sure that legal-economic conditions exist so that the new foods are available
and affordable, especially to those who need them most. Some may believe that
asking this is outside the province of science. The response is that the Future
Benefits argument is sound only insofar as the promises it entails are kept.
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CONCLUSION: KEEPING PROMISES
Recently, Norman Borlaug (2000) offered the argument that we must pursue
agricultural biotechnology as a matter of humanitarian duty. Although his focus
was not GE foods for health, he was referring to one problem that at least one
“food for health”—golden rice—is meant to address: improved nutrition for the
world’s ever-increasing population. It is hard to deny Borlaug’s assessment that
agriculture will not be able to provide enough food without increasing the use
of biotechnology. Nevertheless, what he and many others fail to acknowledge is
that even if we were to produce enough food, poverty, economic underdevelop-
ment, and unjust political regimes would prevent people who need it from
growing and/or obtaining it. If the benefits of GE foods for health, or any other
product of agricultural biotechnology, are to be made available to the starving
populations of less-developed nations (and the poor in North America as well),
political conditions must change. Therefore, it is appropriate and even
imperative that we ask another ethical question: “How can we bring about
international economic justice so that the results of our science can truly
benefit humankind?” The social power of science—and of scientists world-
wide—is such that many small efforts in this regard may yield large payoffs.
Jawaharlal Nehru (1960) wrote:
It is science alone that can solve the problems of hunger and poverty, of
insanitation and illiteracy, of superstition and deadening custom and
tradition, of vast resources running to waste, of a rich country inhabited
by starving people. Who indeed could afford to ignore science today?
At␣ every turn we seek its aid.
The power of science, especially genetic engineering, and its capacity to solve
human problems, seems to establish a noblesse oblige that we are not entitled to
ignore or leave to others—or impersonal market forces—to carry out. If this
appears to overstep the so-called ethical neutrality of science, the presumed
ethical neutrality of those of us in the scientific establishment, so be it. If
science—and now genetic engineering—wants to be judged positively by the
fruits of its labors, we cannot simply cast the fruit on the market, or to the
public, and expect that it will necessarily confer positive results. Rather, we
must tend the fruit, and watch it and guide it, so that we can ultimately say
that␣ this work is indeed ethically justifiable.
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